

31 MAR 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director/Intelligence
 SUBJECT: Special Reserve Panel Study
 REFERENCE: Memorandum to IAD's from DD/I, 13 February 1958

1. In response to the reference request, we have reviewed the Panel's study and have the following comments to make regarding it.

2. The study is well organized and reflects a good deal of careful thought by its authors. It is the first paper known to us which attempts to develop a realistic appreciation of conditions during all-out nuclear war. It certainly stimulates thinking about the practical difficulties that would face CIA activities abroad in time of nuclear war.

3. It appears to us that the study is correct in being somewhat critical of present CIA war planning where the Panel emphasizes the paramount problems of survival, reorganization, and redeployment during the initial phases of a nuclear war and CIA's extremely limited capability during this period.



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5. Although the study mentions certain advantages that might accrue from granting immunity from allied nuclear attacks to some or all of the Satellite countries -- and it is an intriguing concept particularly from CIA's point of view, -- we feel that there may be hidden dangers that might outweigh the advantages.

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6. The paper suggests that there is at present no real planning on the question of surrender terms in the event of a nuclear war. It suggests that "governmental considerations of this question would probably point to a role for CIA to assume." None of us understand what the authors have in mind.

7. Reading the recommendations alone, it would appear that the authors are not fully cognizant of current war planning in the Agency. The following points can be mentioned in this regard:

a. The emphasis on top priority for early warning operations;

b. insistence on the establishment of proper relationships with military commanders in theaters of war to insure adequate CIA support; and

8. We are concerned by the almost complete absence of any discussion about the headquarters role of CIA. Admittedly the Panel explained this away in the foreword by noting the impact on Washington of a nuclear attack. So much of the war planning within the Agency is devoted to overseas problems that some of us wonder about basic recognition of practical wartime roles for individual DD/I components. Certainly there must be definable support roles by DD/I headquarters for overseas activities in advance and in preparation for the initial phases of nuclear war, as well as for a post-hostilities period.

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